The H.A. Chronicles

HPSC2100: BIRTH OF MODERN SCIENCE

ESSAY NO 2

In the era after Copernicus, the centre of the universe was a contested topic questioning whether the sun or the earth is in centre. Bellarmine and Galileo had very differing opinions on this issue. In this essay Bellarmine’s thoughts on the value of Copernicanism will be discussed as well Galileo’s answers to Bellarmine’s worries.

Bellarmine believed that Copernicus’s ideas were unfounded in nature and contrary to the teachings of the Bible. Bellarmine writes that “to affirm that in reality the sun is at the center of the world...is a very dangerous thing… rendering Holy Scripture false” (pg67, Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini). That is, it is okay to talk about Copernicus’s ideas just as a hypothesis but to assume it in reality is counter to the teachings of the Bible. He indicates in his letter that Galileo and Foscarini are speaking about the Copernican model “suppositionally and not absolutely” (pg67, Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini). They are presenting it as a theoretical idea and this doesn’t hold much value for Bellermine. He also believed going against the Scripture just to “save the appearances” and use a theoretical idea, isn’t the same as doing a proper demonstration to actually show that “in truth the sun is in the center and the earth in heaven” (pg67, Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini). He says that “in case of doubt one must not abandon the Holy Scripture” but instead the doubts that are presented should be abandoned (pg68, Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini). That is, since this theoretical idea cannot really be proven, we should not pursue it as it goes against the Scripture. Overall it seems that Bellermine thinks that Copernicus’s ideas are not very plausible in nature as they are not in accordance with the Bible and since the Bible is not at fault, we should not consider the sun centred universe to be true.

Galileo, on the other hand, was in favour of Copernicanism and attempts to solve Bellermine’s worries about falsifying the Bible. He suggests in his “Considerations on the Copernican Hypothesis” that claiming the sun is in the centre of the universe does not falsify the Scripture but all that it does is show us that “we do not grasp its true meaning” (II pg82, Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion). Galileo believes that the Scripture actually “corresponds very well to truths demonstrated about nature” (III pg83, Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion). His argument is that if we try to understand Scripture, as Bellermine does, by just taking its literal meaning then “what a scandal would follow if sense experiences and reasons were to show the opposite” (II pg81, Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion). Instead what we must do is approach any controversy by beginning with the “arguments, confirming the true and refuting the fallacious ones” (II pg82, Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion). Hence if what appears to be the truth seems to disagree with what the Fathers have agreed the Scripture depicts about the issue, then this does not mean the Scripture is wrong or the Fathers are negligent with their interpretation (II pg82, Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion). Instead all this presents us is a better way to understand the Scripture and that the people should be thankful for this (III pg83, Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion). The Fathers are also not negligent “because at their time the opinion of the earth’s motion was totally buried and no one even talked about it, let alone wrote about it or maintained it” (II pg82, Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion). Hence they cannot be negligent of something that they didn’t even know about. However now that it can be shown that the sun is indeed in the centre of the universe, if the Fathers choose to ignore this evidence, then they will be guilty of negligence (II pg82, Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion). Therefore if we are to agree that we are mistaken in the understanding of the meaning of the scripture, then we save ourselves from the dangerous idea that the Scripture is wrong. This is how Galileo attempts to answer Bellermine’s worries about making the universe a sun centred one. It is a very convincing argument as it seems to solve all the issues that Bellermine presents the issue conjures up.

In conclusion it can be seen, the centre of the universe was a very controversial topic as some thought it to be contrary to the teachings of the Scripture. Bellermine did not think the Copernican model was a very accurate model in reality as it did not correspond with the Bible. As a result he believes that the Copernican model can be considered hypothetically but not a real concept. Galileo on the other hand states that the Copernican model does not render the scripture false. All it does is present people with a different way of interpreting the Scripture and that what we observe does not contradict the Scripture in anyway at all. He provides answers to all of Bellermine’s worries.

Reference:

“Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini” pg 67-69 in Finocchiaro, Maurice A. (1989): The Galileo Affair. Berkeley: University of California Press.

“Galileo’s Considerations on the Copernican Opinion” pg 70-86 in Finocchiaro, Maurice A. (1989): The Galileo Affair. Berkeley: University of California Press. 

HPSC2100: BIRTH OF MODERN SCIENCE

ESSAY NO 1

Aristotle and Lucretius both had significant impacts in the birth of modern science in their respective ways. However both of them had different ideas as to how the world operates. In this essay, I will discuss the nature of motion according to Lucretius and Aristotle as reflected in the passages and in the assigned texts. I will also refer to the general concept of nature and its makeup that is suggested in these paragraphs and what they mean by “bodies” and how this relates to their respective concepts of motion.

In Aristotle’s view, all matter is made up of the four elements, earth, water, air and fire. Out of these the heaviest was that each, then water, air and finally fire. These elements arranged themselves naturally according to their weight. Hence earth was arranged in the centre of the universe and this was surrounded by water in a spherical shell around it, followed by air and fire in similar arrangements. Aristotle believed that these elements all move toward their worldly place and this idea is the reason why motion exists in nature (Aristotle, On the Heavens 276b). For instance, Aristotle would see that steam is composed mainly of air hence it raises above all the earth and water and hence comes to rest. This natural motion of the elements trying to achieve order by finding a place where they come to rest would always occur unless it was constrained (Aristotle, On the Heavens 276a). This general concept of nature is the reason why motion occurs, the elements trying to find rest, hence order in the universe.

In contrast to this, Lucretius, as described in his work De Rerum Natura, had a completely differently point view on the general concept of nature and motion. He believed that all matter was composed of atoms which existed in a void that encompassed all of nature. These atoms moved around and collided randomly, though it is not aware what caused these atoms to continuously move (though it not appears what blows do urge them). Lucretius seems to also suggest that these atoms have a constant motion not a “strange” unpredictable motion (They leap asunder, face to face: not strange) that is determined by their weight (Being most hard, and solid in their weights). Lucretius suggests that when a body experiences an outside force from the collisions of some other atoms, it causes that atoms of a different body to react to this collision until they can return to their initial motion and achieve the motion it started off with (“impelled By viewless blows, to change its little course, And beaten backwards to return again”). This outside force is the result of a different force (with different atoms) acting on the atoms that make up that force and this cycle of atoms causing change in another set is an ever continuing cycle of change (battalions contending without halt, In meetings, partings, harried up and down). It is not apparent what causes these collisions but it is never ending. This is the general concept of nature and how motion in the world occurs.

Aristotle and Lucretius also differ in their ideas of what “bodies” are. Aristotle believed that bodies are more then just small atoms; they are the combination of form and matter. They are made up the four elements and take the forms they depict their attributes. However, according to Lucretius, only atoms and the void in which they exist are real and the various collisions and arrangements of these atoms in the void make up what we believe to be bodies (These mites of matter are darted round about…since Space has no bound nor measure). Even those these collisions are happening all the time, the scale at which they are happening are so small that we do not see them in real life, we only see the form which they take (“Until those objects also move…though it not appears”). All the atoms are composed of different types of atoms (“many mites in many a manner mixed”) which give rise to certain shapes and properties.

In conclusion, we can see the distinct difference between both Aristotle and Lucretius. Aristotle believed bodies to be a combination of form and matter and that the reason these bodies experienced motion was due to the elements that made up these bodies returning to their natural resting place. Lucretius on the other hand believed all bodies to be made of little atoms to be made of which collide and arrange themselves in certain ways so we see the motion that we see today. Both these philosophers in their own way and ideas have led to what we call the birth of modern science.

References:

Aristotle (1939): On the Heavens. Guthrie (trans.), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Lucretius: De Rerum Natura. Leonard (trans.), taken from HPSC2100 Blackboard website.

Socrates uses geometry to explain to Meno that we already possess knowledge and hence virtue can’t be taught. However virtue and geometry are two different types of knowledge, where virtue is a collection of values whereas geometry is fact. Virtues are also different for different societies and cultures whereas geometry remains the same no matter where you are. So if we already possessed all knowledge, should it not be that all humans have the same virtues? The fact that they are not, doesn’t that suggest that virtue is indeed taught?

Week5

In the text it says that “Aristotle’s philosophy had of necessity to be modified and qualified.” Since The University of Paris was the only institution that had the works of Aristotle, how can we be sure in this day and age, that the works we have are not infact Aristotle’s, but instead modified versions produced by others?

Week6

Why does Magnus want to, “hide this book from all the foolish” and warning against revealing the secrets of the work? Does he believe that others (the fools) may claim this work not in the interest of Christianity and have it banned like they did with Aristotle’s works?

Week8

Copernicus believed that the only way to save the uniformity of motion and agree with numerical data and observations was to assume particular conditions for the universe. He suggests in these assumptions that the Earth moves around the Sun in a circle and that the Sun is the centre of the universe. However he also suggests that the Sun is away from the centre of the circle that the Earth revolves on. So does that mean that the Earth doesn’t revolve around the centre of the universe, just around some arbitrary point?

Week9

Cardinal Bellarmine rejects the idea that the Earth moves, claiming that it is against the teachings of the scripture and contrary to the interpretations of the Holy Fathers. However when he gives the example of the ship and shore where the eye is in error, he says that this cannot be extended to the Sun and Earth because the eye is not in error. Why can’t the eye be in error in this case also?

Week10

In this reading, Sharp writes very thoroughly the details of posture and figure of a child in the womb. She presents many ideas from other sources but seems to at times to falsify some of the claims made by physicians and anatomists and replaces their claims with hers. She claims that that what she knows through experience and observation is right and cannot be contradicted. Is she suggesting that her experience and observations as a midwife (and not a scientist) are far closer to the truth then the ideas and findings of physicians and anatomists (the scientists)?

Week11

The Preface to Micrographia, Hooke shows a philosophical insight into his method of approach for his study and also includes a technical discussion of Hooke’s own inventions. He seems to delve quite a lot into how to study nature and seems to object to the current methods of studying aspects of nature that seem beyond the reach of the senses. Is he suggesting that to find the true nature of these ‘invisible Notions’, we should give up on the philosophy of the subject and instead rely on direct observations to come to the truth?

Week12

This reading shows the correspondence between Hooke and Newton on the motion of bodies where they discuss various ideas and errors in those ideas. Hooke mentions in the first letter shown that some “have indeavourd to misrepresent me to you” and asks Newton on the issues relating to science to communicate and discuss ideas with him. Judging by this, did Hooke and Newton not like each other, hence causing Hooke to send Newton this letter of in a sense peace offering?

Week13

The scholium following the eight opening definitions of the Principia sets out Newton’s views on absolute time, space, place and motion and proceeds to argue those views. He seems to suggest that absolute quantities are genuinely distinct from relative quantities. Does he mean to say that even if a relative quantity is accurate to the corresponding absolute quantity, it’s just the fault of perception and it actually isn’t thus the absolute quantities are not the same as relative quantities?

WORKSHEET 2 DISABILITY

To give the gift of life is, in my opinion, one of the greatest miracles that two people can achieve. Today as an aftermath of the Human Genome Project, we can now use technology to identify genetic diseases and conditions that a child may have before it is even born. This raises questions as to the morality of this technology and whether it is ethical to in a sense, play God. In the case of the lesbian couple who wish to have a child with deafness, I believe there is nothing immoral or unethical in their decision. They are justified in their decision to have this child.

This case strongly challenges the limits of procreative liberty. Some, in the hearing community, cannot comprehend why anyone would want to create a child with something they see as a disability and a kind of harm. Harris (1992) suggests “we ought not to produce a creature that will probably suffer.” However I ask the question, how exactly is the couple harming the child or causing it to suffer? Savulescu (2002) suggests that the “deaf child is harmed by being selected to exist only if his or her life is so bad it is not worth living.” If it can be proven that the parents will not take care or provide for the child, then it can be said that perhaps this particular child will be harmed. I do not think this to be the case, as one of the parents is quoted to say a child with deafness will be a “special blessing”. Hence it cannot be argued that this course of action is immoral or unethical.

I would also argue that the child is not harmed or made worse off because the only alternative would be to not exist. With proper love and support, as one can imagine this couple would give their child, children with deafness grow to have happy, successful, full filling lives. In fact Parens and Asch (1999) present research findings which show that “families that include disabled children fare on average no better or worse than families in general.” This does not lead me to believe that children with deafness would prefer non existence to deafness.

Another argument is the child’s right to an open future. Davis, (1997, cited in Chadwick and Levitt, 1998) argues that “bringing about the birth of a deaf child is wrong in so far as it denies the child an open future.” So are the couple hindering the child, by only limiting his or her future by choosing deafness? Well I would say not necessarily. If this child does not have an open future making it morally wrong to bring it into the world, would in counter deny the right of that child to exist in the first place. It leads to the above argument whether non existence is better then living with deafness. I would say no. Also in response to Davis’s argument (cited in Chadwick and Levitt, 1998), I would say that parents who choose for deafness are not hindering the child’s ability to a future where they can make choices for themselves. This means that the child does indeed have an open future as it is capable of autonomy and making decisions. Hence, for me, the open future argument does not provide grounds as to why the parent’s decision is immoral or unethical.

In conclusion I would like to reiterate that I believe that the couple have not done anything unethical or immoral by selectively choosing deafness in an embryo for conception. They should have the full right to bring this child into this world.

Word Count = 549 words

References:

Chadwick, R and Levitt, M. 1998. “Genetic technology: A threat to deafness”, Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy, 1:3, pp.209-217

Harris, J. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology, Oxford: Oxford University Press1992, pp.140-161

Parens, E and Asch, A. 1999. “The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing”, Hastings Centre Report, 29:5, S1-S22

Savulescu, J. 2002. “Deaf lesbians, ‘designer disability’, and the future of medicine”, British Medical Journal, 325, pp.771-773

ABORTION WORKSHEET 1

Abortion is a controversial issue that still has no straight answer as to what is morally acceptable in society today. Some people oppose it whilst others believe it to be a matter of choice that shouldn’t be taken away from an individual. In this particular case the two issues that arise are firstly whether abortion is moral and the secondly whether disability is adequate grounds to abort a pregnancy. I also believe that Lisa was justified in her decision to seek abortion.

There is great debate over whether abortion is moral or not. A vast number of proponents argue that “foetuses are not persons or that foetuses are not rational agents or that foetuses are not social beings” (Marquis, 1989). Marquis (1989) states that on the other hand opponents argue that foetuses are infact persons and as such morally it is wrong to kill persons. Lisa’s choice of terminating her pregnancy late in the second trimester definitely would question the idea whether the foetus is infact a person or not. If so, it would lead to a lot of ethical issues being raised as to the morality of her actions.

Another issue that comes up in this debate is the question whether disability is adequate grounds for abortion. There is a belief that people who have disabilities do not lead the same quality of life as people without disabilities. Parens and Asch (1999) suggest that “selective abortion expresses negative or discriminatory attitudes not merely about a disabling trait, but about those who carry it.” They argue that families with children with disabilities fare no better and worse that families without such children. Hence a question arises whether it is ethical for someone to seek abortion on the grounds of disability.

I believe however that Lisa was justified in her decision to terminate the pregnancy. One might say, but abortion is an act of murder, however I question the actual ‘personhood’ of the foetus. Tooley (1998) suggests “an anencephalic human infant…does not and cannot have any interests at all, since it can never be conscious.” A foetus that has never experienced life or no values, cannot be missing out on something as it is not conscious and aware of. If we accept this, as I do, than it can be seen that the foetus is not a ‘person’ and does not have the same rights as a ‘person’.

Thomson (1971) suggests that “men and women both are compelled by law to provide support for their children...we do not have any such “special responsibility” for a person unless we have assumed it.” In this case Lisa’s partner forsakes responsibility upon finding the child has Down Syndrome. If Lisa was to ignore his wishes it’s possible that the child will not experience the love and care that it is entitled to. Instead it may be neglected and lead a very low quality of life. In my opinion, to bring a child into this world and not to provide it with love, care and support is unethical, cruel and abhorrent. There might also be certain implications for Lisa, whose partner upon finding out that she didn’t respect his wishes, may leave her. This would bring hardship on Lisa both financially and emotionally and she may not be able to adequately provide for her child.

It can be seen that this debate over abortion is a very tough issue, however in Lisa’s case I believe she was right in her decision.

Word Count: 546 words

Bibliography:

Marquis, Don. 1989. “Why Abortion is Immoral”, Journal of Philosophy, 86:4, pp.183-202

Parens, E and Asch, A. 1999. “The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing”, Hastings Centre Report, 29:5, S1-S22

Thomson, J. 1971. ‘A Defense of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1:1, pp.47-66

Tooley, M. (1998). “Personhood”. In A Companion to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp.117-27.

WORKSHEET 3: EUTHANASIA

To inflict death on a person would seem to be the ultimate evil. Yet the Euthanasia debate has shown us that inflicting death in the right situation is not always evil. An article that has come into light as a result of this debate is John Hardwig’s argument that all people have a duty to die in certain circumstances even if they wish to live. In this essay, the main premises that Hardwig relies on to reach his conclusion as well as a critique of his argument will be discussed. A counter refutation to this critique will also be presented.

The main premises that Hardwig relies on to come to the conclusion, that in certain circumstances people have a duty to die even if they don’t wish to, is burden. It would seem that families have the moral responsibility to take care of their members if someone was seriously ill. Hardwig however argues that such a responsibility may have dire consequences for those who undertake this responsibility (p36 Hardwig, 1997). In the case of providing care twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, the carer may have to give up their social life, their career and it may cut into their finances as well (p36 Hardwig, 1997). Making this sort of sacrifice, Hardwig feels, is too much for the carer and as a result the ill person must not inflict this sort of burden onto someone they love (p36 Hardwig, 1997). This leads him to the conclusion that in some circumstances people have a duty to die.

The critical responses that follow this article I don’t think were very convincing and provided much harm to Hardwig’s argument. However the most convincing of these is Elizabeth A. Linehan’s response. Linehan suggests that Hardwig’s argument is incomplete as he doesn’t define how exactly one will go about to act on their duty (p4 Churchill et al, 1997). Will they use the aid of a physician? If so do we need to make physician assisted suicide legal? Linehan suggests that this line of thinking is problematic and leads to “slippery slope concerns about the possibilities of abuse” (p5 Churchill et al, 1997). Yet a duty to die does not need to have a physician to do it legally. One could refuse or withhold treatment or food.

But Linehan says that even if one was to try to do this, then this creates many other issues and adds another sense of emotional burden on the family (p5 Churchill et al, 1997). Linehan fails to mention what issues it would create, so one cannot provide a refutation on such a statement. However concerning the emotional burden, Hardwig argues that this would be far less then the burden of care (p37-38 Hardwig, 1997). He gives examples to show this statement to be true and states that it is not morally permissible to ruin someone’s life for you (p37-38 Hardwig, 1997). Hardwig also does mention that the duty to die would not be needed if social policies were such that provided support to families who have seriously ill members, which helped alleviate the burden (p40 Hardwig, 1997). Once the burden is removed then there is no need for this duty.

Linehan also presents a Christian perspective to this debate saying that sometimes living in pain can provide “wisdom and goodness” adding to the spiritual development of the soul (p5 Churchill et al, 1997). However this is something that is quite a personal perspective, as some people may not share the same belief. Yet one could argue that a duty to die brings about a dignified death which adds to the soul as you are preventing harm to someone you love. This can be thought of as a noble and honourable action.

In conclusion, it can be seen that Hardwig’s article provides good reasoning as to why in certain situations we all have a moral duty to die. The critical responses available do not stand up to his argument.

Reference:

·   Hardwig, J. (1997) “Is there a duty to die?”, The Hastings Centre Report, 27: 2, 34-42

·   Churchill, L. Callahan, D. Linehan, E. Thal, A. Graves, F. Prendergrast, A. Flory, D and Hardwig, J. (1997) “To Die or Not to Die”, The Hastings Centre Report, 27: 6, 4-7

HPSC1000 Bioethics

FINAL ESSAY 2011

Are there circumstances in which reproductive cloning of humans would be morally justified? If so, identify the circumstances and elaborate your justification for reproductive cloning. If not, provide reasons as to why reproductive cloning isn’t always immoral.

Human Reproductive Cloning. The concept sends a shiver down the spine of many people as it is considered as a general view, be an immoral and an unethical practise that brings far more harm then benefits to society (Pattinson 2002, 295). But is this a fair claim? Are there no situations where reproductive cloning is morally and ethically justifiable? This essay will look at the case around human reproductive cloning and aim to identify circumstances where it is morally and ethically justifiable.

The best way to start is to look at some of the arguments against human reproductive cloning. Tannert claims that human reproductive cloning is unethical and “violates our basic moral principles” (Tannert 2006, 238). He believes that in the case of natural reproduction, there is no conscious decision to decide the genes for a person and even in the case of natural monozygotic twins, there is no deliberate decision by someone else and that it is just a random occurrence (Tannert 2006, 239). In IVF, while there might be a deliberate or arbitrary decision for the sperm or egg, the recombination of genetic material during gamete development is still a random process (Tannert 2006, 239).

In cloning however, Tannert argues that a clone is an artificial construct and the genes are already determined and is a violation of the “ethical maxim” as it denies human autonomy (Tannert 2006, 239). Pearson however argues that this concept of genetic determinism is a dangerous concept (Pearson 2006, 657). By accepting genetic determinism, we encourage the view that individuals and not environmental or socioeconomic conditions are responsible for things such as illness or cancer (Pearson 2006, 657). Imagine for example, if an employer refuses to provide employees with a safe working environment, claiming any harms caused are as a result of genes, we can see the concept of genetic determinism can be quite harmful and Tannert argument fails.

Pearson also argues against Tannert’s point that human autonomy is denied claiming that Tannert is assuming that genetic identity is equivalent to personal identity (Pearson 2006, 657). Whilst a clone may have the same genes as another person, personality itself is not determined by genes. We cannot say that human autonomy is denied as a clone still has the ability to make their own decisions and choose their life (Pearson 2006, 658). Pattinson agrees with this argument and argues that as long as the act of cloning is not being used to violate the people involved in the process of cloning and as long as the clone’s future rights are not been limited, cloning is morally justified (Pattinson 2002, 305).

There are more arguments against human reproductive cloning but Green argues that they come from misconceptions of science and in the right situations human reproductive cloning is not at all unethical or immoral (Green 2002, 477). Green states there is a concern within the community that human reproductive cloning will bring physical harm to a clone (Green 2002, 480). Pattinson states on the discussion of cloning that many philosophers “have questioned whether a child could be harmed…where the only alternative was not to have been conceived” (Pattinson 2002, 303). So if the only alternative was to not exist, surely living would be a lesser harm. Green agrees with this but adds the extra dimension that scientists must make sure that the technology they use does not cause any harm physically to the clone (Green 2002, 482). A standard of no risk is too demanding but it should be no less safe than IVF or sperm injections (Green 2002, 482).

He also discusses the argument that cloning threatens society as it has a negative impact on the institutions of family and marriage (Green 2002, 477). Green responds by arguing that children born using other technologies experience lives no better or no worse then families with natural births (Green 2002, 485). Hence one cannot say that human reproductive cloning will necessarily have negative impacts on the clone or on society. There will be possibilities never before encountered, but this does not have to be bad (Green 2002, 486). Strong presents the idea that the reason most people object to human reproductive cloning is due to the lack of genetic uniqueness and this would bring harm to the clone (Strong 2005, 654). However Strong says that in the future, cloning can be combined with genetic modification to overcome the idea of lack of uniqueness. Genetic modifications could be done to the embryo which would allow there to be phenotype uniqueness and nuclear DNA uniqueness (Strong 2005, 654). The child would not be a clone, but the techniques used would include the cloning process mainly somatic cell nuclear transfer.

As it can be seen, the arguments against human reproductive cloning do not provide good reason to stop such an endeavour. Green and Pattinson do provide the reader with the distinct feeling that research into this field should be undertaken with great caution and we must make sure that there are proper regulations so as to prevent the misuse of such technology. But there should be no reason as to why human reproductive cloning cannot be a viable option for parents in the future. The rest of this essay will look at circumstances where human reproductive cloning is morally and ethically justified.

Pence argues for the use of somatic cell nuclear transplant claiming that it is a good way of avoiding genetically inherited diseases. If people really are looking for the best possible future for their children, should they not have this option?

A circumstance provided by Strong, where human reproductive cloning would be morally and ethically justified, would be to combine it with genetic modification. In his article he does make the disclaimer that he is assuming that this technology has already been perfected and that anyone cloned through this method will not have deformities or experience any other physical harm. He remains to say that if such a technology was available, would it be ethical to use it and who would benefit from it? He comes to the conclusion that infertile, lesbian and gay couples can benefit from this technology if they wish to have genetically related children. Strong claims that having a child in the “ordinary way” may possibly be valued as it the parents are genetically responsible for the creation of the child. As such this feeling can be emanated by couples who cannot have children of their own, to be active participants in the creation of their children. It would involve one parent providing a cell nucleus meaning that the child would retain most of the genes from this parent. However by applying genetic modification, the other parent can also be a part of this process, giving parents the option of having another way to produce children. It may not be a physical transfer of the genes but there would still b e a genetic connection.

Reference:

Pattinson, Shaun D. 2002. “Reproductive cloning: can cloning harm the clone?” Medical Law Review 10(3): 295-307. Accessed April 17, 2011. doi: 10.1093/medlaw/10.3.295.

Pearson, Yvette. 2006. “Never let me clone?” EMBO Reports 7(7): 657-660. Accessed April 16, 2011. doi: 10.1038/sj.embor.7400741.

Pence, Gregory E. 1998. Who’s afraid of human cloning? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Strong, C. 2005. “Reproductive cloning combined with genetic modification.” Journal of Medical Ethics 31(11): 654–658. Accessed April 10, 2011. doi: 10.1136/jme.2004.011189.

Tannert, Christof. 2006. “Thou shalt not clone.” EMBO Reports 7(3): 238-240. Accessed April 16, 2011. doi: 10.1038/sj.embor.7400653.